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Abstract
This study presents an innovative approach to hand-coding parties’ policy preferences in the relatively new, cross-
sectoral field of climate change mitigation policy. It applies this approach to party manifestos in six countries, comparing
the preferences of parties in Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom over the past two
decades. It probes the data for evidence of validity through content validation and convergent/discriminant validation
and engages with the debate on position-taking in environmental policy by developing a positional measure that
incorporates ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ climate policy preferences. The analysis provides evidence for the validity of the new
measures, shows that they are distinct from comparable measures of environmental policy preferences and argues that
they are more comprehensive than existing climate policy measures. The new measures strengthen the basis for
answering questions that are central to climate politics and to party politics. The approach developed here has
important implications for the study of new, complex or cross-cutting policy issues and issues that include both
valence and positional aspects.
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The success of the Paris Agreement, adopted at the COP21
climate conference in December 2015, depends heavily on
the effectiveness of national climate change mitigation pol-
icies (henceforth climate policies). Political parties will
play a critical role in determining whether governments
develop these policies (Birchall, 2014; Jensen and Spoon,
2011; Schulze, 2014); they also have a unique role in shap-
ing attitudes (Brulle et al., 2012); and they are central to our
understanding of political risks and uncertainties in climate
policy (IPCC, 2014: 6). This article addresses a lacuna in
the literature by presenting an innovative approach to mea-
suring the climate policy preferences of political parties
that involves coding the climate change mitigation policy
content of party manifestos.
Developing valid measures of parties’ climate policy
preferences is a prerequisite for comparative research
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concerning issue politicization, party competition, party
government and political leadership on climate change and
we argue that existing measures, while useful, have impor-
tant shortcomings, some of which are related to character-
istics of climate policy itself. First, it is a relatively new
policy area. While collecting data on new issues is obvi-
ously important, they can be difficult to incorporate into
established coding schemes (Dolezal et al., 2014: 57). Sec-
ond, climate policy is a cross-cutting and multisectoral
issue, which makes it difficult to accommodate in hier-
archically organized coding schemes. Third, climate pol-
icy may have both ‘valence’ and ‘positional’ aspects,
which have implications for how it is measured (Carter
and Clements, 2015; Gemenis et al., 2012). It shares these
characteristics, to the varying degrees, with other issues
such as social exclusion, European integration and immi-
gration (Kriesi et al., 2008: 66; Guinaudeau and Persico,
2013; Castelli Gattinara, 2016: 18–20). We will argue
further that existing attempts to measure parties’ climate
policy preferences are limited by their relatively narrow
focus on single countries, single parties and subsets of
climate policies.
This study contributes to the nascent literature on par-
ties’ climate policies by presenting a new approach that we
apply to six countries, measuring the preferences of the two
largest parties in Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy
and the United Kingdom over the past two decades. Using
Adcock and Collier’s (2001) types of measurement valida-
tion as a framework, we provide evidence for the measures’
validity through content validation and convergent/discri-
minant validation and we build on the existing research on
parties’ environmental policy positions to develop a posi-
tional indicator of parties’ climate policy preferences.
The article begins by reviewing existing approaches to
measuring parties’ environmental and climate policy pre-
ferences while setting out properties that valid measures of
parties’ climate policy preferences should possess. It pre-
sents a new approach to comparing parties’ climate policy
preferences and describes the coding of data from party
manifestos. The analysis then examines the validity of the
measures produced through content validation and conver-
gent/discriminant validation, respectively, before assessing
the validity of a positional measure of parties’ climate pol-
icy preferences. Finally, it discusses the strengths and
weaknesses of the measures it produces, identifies ques-
tions to which they can be usefully applied and highlights
the potential of this new approach for measuring party
preferences in other policy areas.
Measuring parties’ climate
policy preferences
A climate policy is ‘a human intervention to reduce the
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases’ (IPCC,
2014: 4). Climate policies therefore range across many
substantive policy domains. There has been growing inter-
est in national climate policies in recent years as a subject
that is distinct from environmental policy. However, com-
parative scholarship on the domestic politics of climate
change is relatively underdeveloped (Bernauer, 2013;
Lachapelle and Paterson, 2013: 548) and political parties’
climate policy preferences, including their measurement,
have received little attention.
Most measures of party preferences related to climate
change focus on environmental policy, broadly construed.
The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Budge et al.,
2001; Klingemann et al., 2006) identifies and codes a
diverse set of environmental issues in its ‘Environmental
protection’ category (per 501). The Comparative Agendas
Project (CAP) takes a similarly broad approach to coding
environmental policy in party manifestos in its ‘Environ-
ment’ category. Significantly, it contains a subcategory
(#705) that includes some important climate policy content
(‘Air pollution, Global Warming and Noise Pollution’; hen-
ceforth CAP705) (Bevan, 2014). Several expert surveys
include measures of parties’ environmental policy prefer-
ences (Bakker et al., 2015; Benoit and Laver, 2006;
Rohrschneider and Miles, 2015). The expert-coded EU
Profiler and EU&I data also includes parties’ positions
on some specific environmental issues in 2009 and 2014
(Trechsel, 2009; Trechsel et al., 2014). Others have used
relational content analysis of media coverage to measure
parties’ preferences (Helbling and Tresch, 2011), including
on the environment (Kriesi et al., 2008: 60).
Studies specifically addressing parties’ climate policy
preferences are limited in their scope and comprehensive-
ness. Ba˚tstrand (2014) examines the climate policies of
four Norwegian parties in 2009, while Ba˚tstrand (2015)
provides a qualitative cross-national analysis of nine con-
servative parties. These studies identify climate policy
pledges in party manifestos, but only if the party itself
explicitly linked them to climate change. Moreover,
Ba˚tstrand’s interest is specific to certain research questions.
The Norwegian study codes pledges only if they are rele-
vant to the dimension underlying ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics
(Ba˚tstrand, 2014). The later, cross-national study, focuses
on whether the parties ‘express trust in the concept of
anthropogenic climate change’ and whether they propose
climate policy measures ‘in line with free market environ-
mentalism’ (Ba˚tstrand, 2015).
Other studies focus on short periods in individual coun-
tries. De Blasio and Sorice (2013) compare the attention
devoted to climate change by Italian parties in mid-2012,
using keyword searches for ‘climate change’ and cognate
terms in party documents. Case studies of individual parties
(Carter and Clements, 2015) and studies of single-party
governments also focus on parties’ climate policies
(Birchall, 2014; Carter and Jacobs, 2014) but do not
develop a systematic, general approach to measuring par-
ties’ policy preferences.
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We develop and examine new measures of parties’ cli-
mate policy preferences using two of Adcock and Collier’s
(2001) types of measurement validation: content validation
and convergent/discriminant validation. Content validation
refers to the relationship between the indicator and the
‘systematized concept’ and it is a necessary condition for
establishing overall validity. In this regard, a first desirable
property of any indicator is that it should include key ele-
ments and exclude inappropriate elements (Adcock and
Collier, 2001: 538–539).
The most fundamental problem regarding the validity of
the measures described above relates to content validation.
Some clearly leave out important elements of climate pol-
icy (e.g. Ba˚tstrand, 2014, 2015; De Blasio and Sorice,
2013): The CMP codebook did not mention climate change
until 2014. Hierarchical coding schemes such as the CAP
and CMP present a more general problem: while mutually
exclusive, hierarchically organized categories enable these
data sets to cover a wide range of policy domains, they
invariably exclude important content because a piece of
text can belong only to one category (e.g. climate policy
or energy or agriculture). Consequently, the salience of
issues cutting across many categories is likely to be under-
estimated (Guinaudeau and Persico, 2013) and some mea-
sures leave out important elements of climate policy, such
as renewable energy and energy efficiency measures, that
are contained in other categories.
Some measures have the opposite problem: they
include elements that clearly fall outside any definition
of climate policy. This is the case for all general measures
of environmental policy preferences, whether from mani-
festos, expert surveys or media content analyses. The CMP
Environmental Protection category refers, among other
issues, to ‘Animal rights’ and a ‘great variance of policies
that have the unified goal of environmental protection’
(Volkens et al., 2016). The CAP Environment subcate-
gories are likewise wide ranging, including, for instance,
Drinking Water Safety and Water Supply (Bevan, 2014).
This problem also applies to some climate policy-specific
indicators. CAP705 includes such issues as ‘noise pollu-
tion development, rules of upper decibel levels in public
space, noise nuisance in kindergartens’ (Green-Pedersen
and Mortensen, 2014: 20).
Convergent/discriminant validation concerns an indica-
tor’s relationships with other measures. We expect measures
of the same concept to be empirically associated (i.e. to
converge) (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 540); this is a second
desirable property of any new measure. Following from this,
the closer the association of a given measure with parties’
climate policy preferences (rather than environmental policy
preferences), the stronger the relationship should be with the
measures of climate policy preferences developed here. Yet
it should not be so strong (i.e. approaching identity) to sug-
gest that the measures developed here add little or nothing to
existing measures.
Drawing on the literature on position-taking in environ-
mental policy, we identify a third desirable property of a
valid measure of climate policy preferences: that it can take
into account policy preferences that directly subvert cli-
mate policy goals. Even where a party proposes climate
change mitigation policies, the effects of those policies
could be undermined if it also proposes policies that would
increase emissions, such as increased support for new coal-
fired power stations. Identifying such measures helps to
control for internal inconsistency in party policy that may
arise from ‘greenwashing’, the kind of ‘cheap talk’ that can
be mistaken for an indicator of a party’s policy preferences.
While environmental policy is widely regarded as ‘a
classic valence issue’, this assumption is increasingly being
questioned. Climate policy in particular is an issue some-
times characterized by sharp disagreement, which can
range from climate change deniers questioning the very
fundamentals of climate science to conflict over specific
climate measures, such as expanding onshore wind power
or the use of green taxes. Such tensions can underpin par-
tisan divisions over climate change (Carter and Clements,
2015; Guber, 2013). More generally, saliency theory has
been questioned (Dolezal et al., 2014); the value of mea-
suring both salience and position has been highlighted (e.g.
Guinaudeau and Persico, 2014); and the CMP has been
criticized for failing to separate its indicators of salience
and position (Dolezal et al., 2014: 61–62; Lowe et al.,
2011: 133; cf. Volkens, 2007: 117). We do not settle these
questions here, but we do build on Compston and Bailey’s
(2013) concept of ‘anti-climate policy’ and Weale et al.’s
(2000: 247–250) approach to constructing an environmen-
tal policy index to develop a measure that can be regarded
as positional at the level of climate policy preferences.
Coding parties’ climate policy preferences
Existing manifesto-based projects using hand-coding pro-
vide a basis for important elements of our coding scheme.
Like the CMP, the CAP and Ba˚tstrand (2014, 2015), we use
parties’ main pre-election documents as the principal
source of data (see Online Appendix A). The benefits of
using these documents are well known: they set out the
party’s official policy preferences, they are publicly avail-
able and amenable to ex post analysis and they are unlikely
to contain only cheap talk.
Like the CMP and the CAP projects, we use quasi-
sentences – ‘the verbal expression of one political idea or
issue’ (Klingemann et al., 2006: 165) – as the unit of obser-
vation (see Online Appendix B). We also share their
assumption that the proportion of a party document devoted
to a particular type of content is related to its ‘salience’ for
that party, which in turn reflects its policy preferences.
Unlike these projects, we focus on a single policy area
(climate policy), anchored in a single hypothetical policy
outcome (greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions). We assume
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that the relative simplicity of our coding scheme reduces
coding error compared to more complex schemes covering
numerous policy areas, consistent with criticisms of coding
scheme complexity made by both architects and critics of
the CMP (Budge, 2006: 84; Mikhaylov et al., 2012: 80).1
Moreover, its relative simplicity facilitates the coding of a
cross-sectoral issue, building on previous approaches to
coding EU issues in the CAP project (Guinaudeau and
Persico, 2013).
We aim to reduce potential ambiguity in the coding
scheme (and, thus, the likelihood of coding error) by
explicitly articulating our coding categories, which follow
from the definition of climate policy set out above. Our
first substantive concern is with ‘pro-climate’ content:
content that indicates support for policies that would, if
implemented, reduce GHG emissions or enhance GHG
sinks. Many such policies in developed economies are
well mapped in standard accounts (e.g. Compston and
Bailey, 2016). They typically include supports for energy
efficiency, the reduction of emissions from specific sec-
tors (e.g. energy, transport and agriculture), and overarch-
ing measures such as carbon pricing and the creation of
institutions to govern climate policy. However, party doc-
uments are not simply lists of policy proposals: much text
simply expresses a party’s general attitude or sentiment on
an issue. Where this indicates support for emissions-
reducing policies, it is also coded as pro-climate content.
Examples include content acknowledging climate change
as a policy problem and expressing support for climate
change mitigation or for environmental protection that
implicitly includes climate protection.
Coding was carried out by researchers with expertise in
climate policy and with knowledge of each country. Hand-
coding of manifestos facilitated the application of context-
sensitive expertise at the level of individual quasi-sentences
(Volkens, 2007: 117). This expertise is important for two
reasons: first, because the coding of these categories is, in
principle, context specific: the same policy in two countries
may have a different significance. For example, building
nuclear power capacity in a country that depends wholly on
coal for electricity generation will reduce GHG emissions;
building it in a country that depends wholly on renewable
sources of electricity may increase emissions. Second,
sometimes further research was required to establish the
policy’s prospective impact on GHG emissions at the time
the manifesto was published, and coders with expertise were
well placed to carry out that research. An example was
high-speed rail in the United Kingdom, which was
ultimately coded as having an ambiguous effect on the UK’s
emissions.2 While, in practice, many policies were coded
similarly across contexts, the accommodation of context-
sensitive expertise speaks to criticisms of manifesto-based
data for being insufficiently sensitive to context (Franzmann
and Kaiser, 2006; Mo¨lder, 2016) and has a precedent in
evidence-based expert-coding (Trechsel, 2009).
We aimed to minimize error further through central coor-
dination and standardized procedures, drawing on lessons
from other, larger hand-coding projects (Budge et al, 2001:
Ch. 4; Volkens et al., 2009). Coders received a set of instruc-
tions (Online Appendix B) and a piece of correctly coded
text as an example. Where difficult coding decisions arose,
these were coded as such and then discussed and resolved
with (and among) the authors, who coordinated the coding
process. Some 69% of manifestos were double-checked by
different coders. This was particularly intensive earlier in the
coding process, as difficult coding issues were resolved and
coding decisions standardized (see Volkens et al., 2009:
244). However, this did not amount to independent coding
of manifestos by multiple coders and like other projects
based on hand-coding, we face potential problems of relia-
bility (Volkens, 2007: 118). Where doubts remained about
an item, claims made in the party document regarding the
emissions impact of a policy measure were taken into
account (i.e. parties were given the ‘benefit of the doubt’).
A set of subcategories was developed to provide insights
into the substantive content of the pro-climate text and as a
means of systematically varying the content of our mea-
sures (see Table 1). To assign text to these substantive
subcategories, each quasi-sentence was inductively
labelled with a topic and then aggregated into broader,
logically coherent categories. The aggregation of these
labels fed back into the development of a codebook deli-
miting the categories (Online Appendix C). Coders also
completed a questionnaire concerning basic document
characteristics for each manifesto that we use later in the
analysis (Online Appendix D).
Following the same procedures, we laid the basis for a
positional measure of climate policy preferences by identify-
ing anti-climate content. Drawing on Compston and Bailey’s
(2013) work on governments’ anti-climate policies and a
broader definition of climate policy covering all policy
measures that influence emissions (EBRD and GRI,
Table 1. Pro-climate subcategories.
Mean % of pro-climate content
Core subcategories
Pro-environment 35.1
Pro-climate policy (other) 14.4
Pro-lower carbon energy 12.8
Pro-lower carbon transport 11.4
Pro-energy efficiency 6.9
Pro-carbon sinks 3.1
Non-core subcategories
Planning 7.6
Agriculture and food 5.6
Waste 3.1
Anti-growth 0.03
Note: See Online Appendix C for detailed descriptions of these
subcategories. N ¼ 62. Two manifestos contained no ‘pro-climate’
content.
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2011: 60), we identified content that indicates support for
policies that would increase GHG emissions or diminish
GHG sinks. It includes quasi-sentences that deny that cli-
mate change is a problem, oppose climate change mitiga-
tion policies or make specific policy proposals (e.g.
opening a new airport) that would increase GHG emissions
(Compston and Bailey, 2013: 147–148; see Table 2).3
Case selection
The data cover 64 parties-at-elections in six countries
(Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the United
Kingdom) from the mid-1990s until 2015. The manifestos
vary in length. The Danish documents are particularly
short: 338 quasi-sentences on average, compared to a mean
document length of 1161 quasi-sentences across all coded
documents.4 Occasionally, the main parties were electoral
coalitions (e.g. in Italy in 2001 and 2006). Sometimes, a
party’s manifesto also represented smaller parties belong-
ing to their electoral coalition (e.g. the Danish centre-left in
2011); here, we assume that the preferences of the main
coalition party are accurately represented in the document
(see Online Appendix A for details).
The six West European countries selected have much in
common: they are all long-standing EU member states;
they each have an established environmental policy arena;
and, with the exception of France, they are heavily depen-
dent on fossil fuels. Within that universe, they are diverse
along dimensions that may influence the structure of cli-
mate politics (although given the paucity of existing
research our expectations are necessarily tentative). They
encompass both leaders and laggards on climate policy;
small and large countries; a range of public concern about
climate change; a variety of GHG emissions profiles, mea-
sured by per capita emissions, the share of emissions from
agriculture compared to fossil fuel use and the range of
policy effort required for the 2012 and 2020 commitment
periods. Overall, we expect inter-country differences to be
relatively small given these important similarities, an
expectation supported by analysis of variance tests on each
of the measures, which show no statistically significant
differences between country means.
The period covered encompasses several electoral
cycles in each country (32 in total) allowing us to examine
variation in climate policy preferences within parties over
time. It begins before the Kyoto Protocol was agreed (1997)
and after climate change had become a distinct policy prob-
lem for governments in the early 1990s.
Within each country, we focus on the two largest parties
by vote share before each election.5 Due to their centrality
to coalition formation, national policy and public opinion,
these are parties of particular substantive importance and
therefore of importance for the study of party government
and political leadership on climate change. The selection of
parties also limits diversity in key respects. Each party
could expect to enter government in the short or medium
term (i.e. they were ‘parties of government’). Conse-
quently, they could anticipate having to solve emergent
policy problems; variation in their responses to climate
change is therefore interesting and, in the face of a clear
policy problem such as climate change, potentially
puzzling.
In each country, we cover periods when each party has
been in government and in opposition and, in each country,
the two parties fall on either side of the main left-right
cleavage structuring the party system (the exception being
the Irish party system). Following from the existing studies
of parties’ climate policies (e.g. Batstrand, 2014, 2015), we
expect left-of-centre parties to develop more progressive
climate policy preferences than right-of-centre parties.
Pro-climate content: General description
Across 64 documents, 4568 quasi-sentences were coded as
pro-climate content. The mean proportion of a manifesto
accounted for by pro-climate policy is 6.0% (standard
deviation (SD) ¼ 3.1). Figure 1 shows considerable varia-
tion between parties and, within parties, variation over
time. Denmark’s centre-right Venstre, for example,
included no pro-climate content in 1994 or 1998, while in
2007, it occupied 17% of its manifesto’s text. This extreme
case of within-party variation finds confirmation in case
studies developed elsewhere (Seeberg, 2016). Other high
points in the amount of pro-climate content (e.g. the
Table 2. Document attributes and climate policy preferences.
N
% pro-climate content % Core pro-climate content
Mean p Value Mean p Value
Acknowledges climate change No 24 5.1
0.04
3.7
0.00
Yes 40 6.6 5.8
Commits to national climate goals No 33 5.7
0.16
4.4
0.04
Yes 31 6.4 5.7
Climate change in front matter* No 43 5.5
0.02
4.3
0.01
Yes 19 7.3 6.6
Note: p Values are for one-tailed t-tests. p values for tests assuming unequal variance are in italics.
*Two documents did not include front matter.
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Italian Partito Democratico in 2008; the Danish Social
Democrats in 2007) also accord with existing case studies
(Carter et al. 2014), as do some low points (the UK
Conservatives in 1997 and 2001; Ireland’s Fianna Fa´il in
2011; the Italian centre-right in 2006) (Carter and Clem-
ents, 2015; Little (2017); Pizzimenti, 2009). More gener-
ally, the difference between centre-left parties (mean ¼
6.8%) and centre-right parties (mean ¼ 5.4%) is in the
expected direction and statistically significant (p ¼ 0.04),
while the difference between pre-economic crisis (before
mid-2008; mean ¼ 6.4%) and parties since the crisis (after
mid-2008; mean ¼ 5.2%) is significant at the 0.1 level.6
Content validation and a core measure
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between our
data and alternative measures is the amount of content
coded as relevant to climate policy and thus its compre-
hensiveness. The most directly comparable measure in the
CAP (CAP705) includes an average of four quasi-
sentences for each document we code. Both CMP Envi-
ronmental Protection category (mean ¼ 34 quasi-sen-
tences) and the CAP Environment category (mean ¼ 50)
have a broader base of content. The content coded for our
measure incorporates an average of 70 pro-climate quasi-
sentences per document and is more squarely focused on
climate policy per se.
Table 1 provides an overview of the substantive content
of the text coded as pro-climate. In the average manifesto,
84% of pro-climate content is accounted for by six cate-
gories of quasi-sentence encompassing content that is gen-
erally acknowledged as being relevant to GHG emissions.
These are general pro-environment content indicating sup-
port for reduced GHG emissions (35%) and content
Figure 1. Pro-climate content.
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indicating support for lower carbon transport (11%), lower-
carbon energy (13%), energy efficiency (7%), carbon sinks
(3%) and other specific climate policy content (14%).
The remainder of the coded content, accounting for 16%
of the average manifesto’s pro-climate content (and 1% of
the manifesto’s overall content), concerns policies typically
seen as being less central aspects of climate policy: plan-
ning, waste and agriculture measures, and negative men-
tions of economic growth. To address doubts concerning
the relevance of the coded text in these categories, and
following Adcock and Collier’s (2001: 539) advice to
examine the effects of varying the content of indicators,
we propose a second, core, measure that focuses on indica-
tions of support for a narrower set of core climate policies.7
Convergent/discriminant validation
We assess the evidence for validity through convergent/
discriminant validation in two parts. First, we examine the
relationship between our measures of parties’ climate pol-
icy preferences and document attributes that serve as crude
indicators of parties’ preferences. Second, we examine
their relationship with established measures of parties’
environmental and climate policy preferences.
Document attributes
We examine the following document attributes: whether
the document acknowledges climate change as a problem;
whether it commits the party to climate change targets;
whether it mentions climate change in its front matter; and
the number of mentions of climate change and cognate
terms as a proportion of the overall word count. The rela-
tive frequency of these attributes appears to correspond to
their significance as indicators of climate policy prefer-
ences: of the 64 documents, 40 acknowledge climate
change as a problem, 31 make commitments to national
climate change goals and 19 mention climate change in the
document’s front matter.
We find strong evidence that these attributes are related
to the general and core measures of parties’ climate policy
preferences. For both measures and all of the document
attributes, the difference in mean values is in the expected
direction and, with one exception, these differences are
statistically significant. The size of the mean differences
(see Table 2) ranges from 0.7 to 2.3 percentage points,
which, given that the general and core content accounts
on average for 6% and 5% of manifesto content, respec-
tively, seems sizeable. Climate change mentions (mean ¼
0.03) correlate positively and moderately with both
measures. The correlation with the core measure (r ¼ 0.45,
p ¼ 0.00) is stronger than the correlation with the general
measure (r ¼ 0.32, p ¼ 0.01).
Established measures
We also compare our measures to established measures of
climate and environmental policy preferences for which
data are available: the CAP climate policy and environment
measures, the CMP Environmental Protection measure and
its log-transformation devised by Lowe et al. (2011) and
expert survey environmental salience measures. We expect
positive correlations with each measure, but we do not
expect the relationship to be so strong that they might be
considered effectively identical. We also expect more spe-
cific measures of climate policy preferences (e.g. the CAP
climate policy measure) to correlate more strongly than
more general measures of environmental policy
preferences.
The results in Table 3 bear out these expectations. The
relationship between both general and core measures of
‘pro-climate content’ and four established salience-based
measures of environment and climate policy is positive in
all instances and is statistically significant (p < 0.05) in 8 of
10 instances. The correlations are moderate rather than
Table 3. Comparison with existing salience-based measures.
Data source Issue N Measure Pearson’s r p
CAP Climate* 34 General 0.42 0.01
Core 0.54 0.00
CAP Environment 34 General 0.29 0.1
Core 0.39 0.02
CMP Environmental protection 62** General 0.4 0.00
Core 0.48 0.00
Lowe et al. (2011) Environment (importance) 50 General 0.46 0.00
Core 0.54 0.00
Expert surveys*** Environment 24 General 0.42 0.04
Core 0.32 0.12
Note: CAP: Comparative Agendas Project; CMP: Comparative Manifestos Project.
*CAP705. The available CAP data do not include Ireland or Germany.
**See Online Appendix E for details.
***Benoit and Laver (2006) and Bakker et al. (2015). See Online Appendix E for details.
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strong and do not approach identity in any instance. They
are stronger for CAP’s climate-specific measure than for
the general environmental policy measures, with the excep-
tion of Lowe et al.’s (2011) measure. It is notable that the
core measure correlates considerably more strongly with
CAP705 than the general measure. The wide range of the
expert survey correlation coefficients may reflect the small
number of observations available for these data.
Positional measures
To develop a positional measure of climate policy prefer-
ences, we counterpose pro- and anti-climate content. For
content validation, and in contrast to established positional
measures, this has the merit of pitting two ‘opposites’
against one another, rather than two more loosely related
concepts (i.e. environment vs. economy). Overall, 1971
quasi-sentences (2.7% of coded quasi-sentences or 31 per
document, on average) were coded as anti-climate content.
Despite our relatively conservative approach to coding
anti-climate content (cf. Compston and Bailey, 2013), a
large proportion of the substantive content of the anti-
climate category consists of general economic policies
(Table 4). These categories may contribute to a fuller pic-
ture of parties’ climate policy preferences, but they also
risk ‘stretching’ the concept of climate policy (Sartori,
1970). At first sight, then, the relationship between this
content and the concept of ‘climate policy preferences’
seems more tenuous than for the pro-climate category.
To address this problem, we again identify two groups
of quasi-sentences: core content referring to support for
policies that are generally acknowledged as having a direct
impact on GHG emissions and additional non-core content
referring to more general economic policies.
To produce the general positional measure of parties’
climate policy preferences, we subtract the total anti-
climate content from the total pro-climate content. This
derives a mean climate policy position of 2.7 (SD ¼ 6.2).
Likewise, to produce a core positional measure, we subtract
parties’ core anti-climate content from their core pro-
climate content. The mean core position is 4.2 (SD ¼
3.5). The mean (absolute) difference between the general
and core positional scores is 2.1 points (median ¼ 1.3).
We again engage in convergent/discriminant validation
by comparing these measures with document attributes and
with established positional measures. The former compar-
ison shows substantial and statistically significant mean
differences in the expected direction (Table 5).
General and core climate policy positions also correlate
positively and significantly with four existing measures of
parties’ environmental policy positions (Table 6): an addi-
tive index of two expert-coded positional climate policy
items; Weale et al.’s (2000) environmental policy index
using CMP data; a log-transformed measure proposed by
Lowe et al. (2011) and positional items in expert surveys
(Bakker et al., 2015; Benoit and Laver, 2006). These cor-
relations are by far the strongest for the most climate-
specific measure (almost reaching r ¼ 0.6); for the general
environmental policy measures, they range between 0.29
and 0.48.
Discussion
Our analysis produces three sets of findings. First, regard-
ing content validation, while the content of the pro-climate
text tends to accord with existing knowledge concerning
those policy categories most relevant to GHG emissions,
the content of the anti-climate text as coded initially was
less obviously related to the concept of climate policy. We
responded by creating ‘core’ measures. Second, regarding
convergent/discriminant validation, the measures are
related to document attributes and to established measures
of climate and environmental policy preferences. Their
relationship with climate policy measures is markedly
stronger than with environmental policy measures, suggest-
ing that they are better measures of climate policy prefer-
ences than measures of general environmental policy
preferences. Yet they do not come close to being identical
with existing measures, suggesting that they constitute a
new and distinctive contribution to the measurement of
parties’ climate policy preferences. Contextual differences
between parties (left-right differences, the presence of the
economic crisis) and accounts of individual cases also con-
verge with expectations. Third, we have developed posi-
tional measures, which also accord with our expectations
concerning convergent/discriminant validation.
Not only are our measures empirically distinct from
extant measures of parties’ environmental and climate pol-
icy preferences, the approach that produces them also has
several advantages. It accommodates the cross-sectoral
nature of climate policy; so, in common with Guinaudeau
and Persico’s (2013) approach to EU policy, it can provide
Table 4. Anti-climate subcategories.
Mean % of anti-climate content
Core subcategories
Pro-roads 8.6
Pro-aviation and shipping 6.2
Pro-fossil fuels 3.8
Anti-environmental taxes 3.4
Anti-climate (other) 1.8
Anti-nuclear 1.5
Non-core subcategories
Pro-growth 32.5
Anti-taxes 18.6
Pro-tourism 10.4
Pro-global free trade 6.5
Agriculture 2.3
Note: See Online Appendix C for detailed descriptions of these
subcategories. N¼ 62. Two manifestos contained no ‘anti-climate’ content.
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a model for studies of other cross-sectoral policy areas. The
coding scheme is relatively simple and, based on existing
arguments concerning coding scheme design, we assume
that this minimizes error. The coding process allows for
contextual specificity within a systematic framework for
scoring cases, which enables its application to other con-
texts, including future party documents, while being based
on a fixed assumption: that reducing GHG emissions will
remain the central outcome in climate policy. It covers as
many aspects of ‘climate policy’ as possible, as evidenced
by the amount of content coded compared to other projects.
In the ‘trade-off between parsimony and completeness’
(Adcock and Collier, 2001: 539), we argue that existing
measures err on the side of parsimony, not least in the case
of climate policy. Where there is doubt about the evidence
from content validation, our coding of subcategories allows
researchers to vary the content of the measures systemati-
cally without having to recode the texts themselves.
Finally, in contrast to measures of salience, we produce a
measure which aims to account for the positional aspect of
climate politics and which may help to control for contra-
dictions in party policy, including greenwashing.
These observations require at least two riders. First, our
measurements should be regarded as ‘falsifiable claims’
(Adcock and Collier, 2001: 532). Second, we do not claim
that existing approaches or data are without merit. The
moderate-to-strong correlations with our measure indicate
convergence, even if these measures evidently include con-
tent that is not relevant to climate policy or exclude content
that is relevant to climate policy. Moreover, beyond their
measurement of climate policy preferences, these
approaches have further added value, such as including
multiple other issues (CAP, CMP) and focusing on inter-
esting theoretical questions (Ba˚tstrand, 2014, 2015).
A question that we have not addressed directly is which
of our four measures is ‘best’. Content validation – a pre-
requisite for overall validity – suggests there is doubt about
our general positional variable, as elements of anti-climate
policy may stretch the concept of climate policy. More
generally, we show that ‘anti-climate policy’, while intui-
tive and useful, can be problematic in its application, even
when applied conservatively.
Distinguishing between the merits of the other three
measures (general, core and core positional measures) is
more difficult. We have no ‘true’ measure of parties’ cli-
mate policy preferences against which they can be evalu-
ated for criterion validity. The three measures take into
account overlapping but somewhat different content
(Tables 2 and 4). The relative merit of the positional mea-
sure may vary depending on how climate policy is con-
ceived as an issue (valence or positional). We have
highlighted arguments indicating the latter, but we do not
regard them as definitive. The nature of the issue may vary
between context and over time and it may be useful to
measure both salience and position (Guinaudeau and Per-
sico, 2014). Moreover, core and ‘non-core’ content as pre-
sented here is an informed approximation rather than a
definitive distinction.
Significantly, our analyses show that binary indicators
of document attributes discriminate between parties with
stronger and weaker climate policy preferences – a poten-
tially valuable insight highlighting measures of party policy
preferences that can be collected at low cost.
Table 5. Document attributes and climate policy preferences (positional).
N
General climate policy position Core climate policy position
Mean p Value Mean p Value
Acknowledges climate change No 24 0.1 0.02 2.6
Yes 40 4.2 5.2 0.00
Commits to national climate goals No 33 1.2 0.02 3.3
Yes 31 4.2 5.1 0.02
Climate change in front matter* No 43 1.4 0.00 3.3
Yes 19 5.6 6.1 0.00
Note: p Values are for one-tailed t-tests. p Values for tests assuming unequal variance are in italics.
*Two documents did not include front matter.
Table 6. Comparison with existing positional measures.
Data Issue N Pearson’s r p
EU Profiler/
EU&I
Index:
renewables
and private
transport
taxation*
21 General 0.59 0.00
Core 0.58 0.01
Environmental
policy index
(Weale
et al., 2000)
Environment 62 General 0.48 0.00
Core 0.44 0.00
Lowe et al.
(2011)
Environment 50 General 0.34 0.02
Core 0.29 0.04
Expert
surveys**
Environment 32 General 0.39 0.03
Core 0.46 0.01
*See Online Appendix E for details.
**Benoit and Laver (2006) and CHES (2010, 2014). See Online Appendix E
for details.
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We acknowledge that our approach has possible short-
comings. Although our positional measure has the merit of
pitting two clearly articulated opposing concepts against
one another, rather than the traditional ‘economy vs envi-
ronment’ approach, it is not a ‘pure’ positional measure.
This problem is difficult to avoid in manifesto-based
approaches focusing on a broad policy dimension. In com-
mon with previous efforts to derive measures of policy
preferences from manifestos, we weight each unit of con-
tent equally, whereas clearly some policies are more sig-
nificant for GHG emissions than others. The main
alternative is to estimate the ‘weight’ of various pieces of
content in terms of GHG emissions; outside this approach,
a climate policy expert survey may implicitly take this into
account. Finally, although we explicitly focus on minimiz-
ing error (and maximizing validity) through the design of
the coding scheme and mechanisms of control, standardi-
zation and cross-checking, we also acknowledge that using
multiple independent coders is desirable and would allow
us to measure that error.
Conclusion
This article has presented an innovative approach to mea-
suring parties’ policy preferences consisting of a set of
salience and positional measures of climate change mitiga-
tion policy and has applied it to party manifestos in six
European countries. It has presented evidence for the valid-
ity of these measures and has found that they are empiri-
cally distinct from and more comprehensive than extant
measures. It argues that these measures represent a signif-
icant improvement on existing measures of parties’ climate
policy preferences.
When new, cross-sectoral issues come on to the policy
agenda and become increasingly distinct from established
policy dimensions, parties’ preferences regarding those
issues need to be measured so that questions central to party
politics can be answered. The approach developed here can
be extended to other policy areas and may be particularly
beneficial for policies that are new, complex or cross-
cutting or that include valence and positional elements.
One example is immigration policy (Castelli Gattinara,
2016: 17–20; Kriesi et al., 2008: 66). While immigration
is more regularly seen as a positional issue than climate
change, it could benefit from anchoring its coding in two
opposite policy outcomes (more vs. less immigration) and
from the overall simplicity of a one-dimensional coding
scheme. Other such issues may include European integra-
tion and social exclusion.
Measuring parties’ climate policy preferences is an
important step towards understanding their development
and how they might shape other outcomes, especially gov-
ernment policy. We hope that these measures will be taken
forward and applied to questions that are central to climate
politics and to party politics. This may lead to further
evidence for the validity of these measures, corresponding
to ‘nomological/construct validation’ (Adcock and Collier,
2001: 543) as hypothesised relationships (e.g. between
party preferences and government policies or between eco-
nomic conditions and party preferences) are confirmed.
This kind of research can also contribute to the broader
climate change research agenda and specifically to our
understanding of the political obstacles to and opportunities
for effective policy.
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Notes
1. We outline several ways in which we aimed to minimize error.
We cannot measure the reduction in error resulting from these
decisions; rather, our argument that these features reduce error
is based on assumptions that are grounded in the existing
literature.
2. ‘Ambiguous’ quasi-sentences were not counted as pro- (or
anti-) climate content.
3. We use Compston and Bailey’s (2013: 148) list of anti-climate
policies as a starting point, but we do not adhere to it strictly
(see Online Appendix B).
4. We ran the tests for convergent/discriminant validation that
follow while excluding the Danish documents (n ¼ 14). Our
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findings are generally borne out by these tests, although in
some instances the reduced n leads to higher p values (see
Online Appendix F).
5. There is one marginal exception to this rule: Denmark’s Vens-
tre before the 1994 election. In 1990, it had secured 0.6% less
than the Conservatives.
6. One-tailed t-tests assuming equal variance.
7. The core measure developed here is unrelated to Jahn’s (2011)
core measure of left-right preferences.
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